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ABSTRACT
Robustness of neural networks has recently attracted a great amount of interest. The many investiga-
tions in this area lack a precise common foundation of robustness concepts. Therefore, in this paper,
we propose a rigorous and flexible framework for defining different types of robustness that also help
to explain the interplay between adversarial robustness and generalization. The different robustness
objectives directly lead to an adjustable family of loss functions. For two robustness concepts of
particular interest we show effective ways to minimize the corresponding loss functions. One loss is
designed to strengthen robustness against adversarial off-manifold attacks, and another to improve
generalization under the given data distribution. Empirical results show that we can effectively train
under different robustness objectives, obtaining higher robustness scores and better generalization, for
the two examples respectively, compared to the state-of-the-art data augmentation and regularization
techniques.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are the state-of-the-art solutions
for a large number of classification problems. For ex-
ample, convolutional neural networks (CNN) [6, 14], are
the state-of-the-art method for image classification (see,
e.g., [23, 29, 12]) However, the phenomenon of adver-
sarial examples [24, 7] has raised serious concerns about
the reliability of machine learning solutions, especially
in safety-critical applications. Autonomous driving and
counterfeit bill detection are two intuitive examples where
safety concerns play a fundamental role. The vulnerabil-
ity of machine learning models to adversarial examples is
widely interpreted as a lack of robustness of these mod-
els, and a large amount of recent work investigates ro-
bustness properties, with a strong focus on deep neural
network models. Research in this area has been pursued
both from the perspective of formal verification with its
traditional objective of rigorously proving safety properties
of hard- and software systems [19, 4, 3, 1, 2], and from
the perspective of machine learning with its traditional
objective of optimizing expected values of performance
measures [16, 10, 5, 20, 22].
In most of these works, the focus is on one of two separate
issues: either assessing the robustness properties of a given
model, or improving the robustness properties of learned
classifiers by developing new training techniques. Work
with a background in formal verification mostly focuses
on the first issue, while in the field of machine learning the
second plays a larger role. However, in machine learning,
too, the problem of assessing robustness has received a
lot of attention, especially in connection with designing
adversarial attacks [7, 16, 10, 22]. Works that propose
to defend against adversarial attacks by learning more ro-
bust models often introduce new types of loss functions
that combine an accuracy and robustness objectives. For
example, [10] introduces a penalty term that enforces gra-
dients of different output values to be as similar as possible;
[5] propose a margin loss that penalizes according to the
displacement of an example with respect to the decision
boundary of the true class. [27] proposed a method to
learn deep ReLU-based classifiers that are provably robust
against adversarial perturbations on the training data, by
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considering the convex outer approximation of the set of
activations reachable through a norm-bounded perturba-
tion. Finally, [20] observed that the intermediate layers
are highly susceptible to adversarial perturbations of small
magnitude. They proposed a training method to ensure the
robustness at the feature layers.
The underlying concept of robustness often only is implicit
in the proposed loss function and/or the experimental pro-
tocol used to evaluate robustness properties. As a result,
there does not yet appear to be a common full understand-
ing of what robustness actually is, and how it relates to
other properties of classification models. For example, [26]
have argued that the objectives of robustness and accuracy
are in conflict with each other, whereas [21] come to some-
what opposite conclusions: they argue that robustness and
generalization capabilities are in conflict only when robust-
ness is designed to defend against “off-manifold” attacks,
i.e., adversarial examples that do not follow the data distri-
bution, whereas they are consistent with each other in the
scenario of “on-manifold” adversarial examples.
Underlying these differences are not so much theoretical
or empirical discrepancies, as conceptual differences on
what one wants to capture with robustness. In this paper
we first aim to put the analysis of robustness properties
on a more solid foundation by identifying the key ingredi-
ents that underlie different notions of robustness. We then
develop a general framework for the specification of differ-
ent robustness concepts that captures most of the concepts
previously used (implicitly or explicitly) in the literature,
and that helps to clarify their basic structural differences.
We show how the general framework for robustness speci-
fications lead to a general methodology for learning robust
models using a uniform class of loss functions and compu-
tational architectures. The methodology is instantiated for
two different robustness objectives. In particular, for the
objective that most closely follows the (implicit) objective
of previous work, we obtain an architecture that consists
of a pair of deep neural networks: one classifier network,
and a generator network for adversarial examples. The two
networks are trained simultaneously to converge to an equi-
librium at which the classifier network is robust against the
adversarial examples produced by the generator.
The key contributions of this paper are:
• A general analysis and specification framework
for robustness concepts
• A methodology for training under a given robust-
ness objective
• Implementations of the methodology for two dif-
ferent robustness objectives, including a novel
classifier/adversary co-training approach
• Experimental evaluations that show competitive
and sometimes superior robustness results com-
pared to various state-of-the-art methods
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
our general robustness framework with particular emphasis
on several possible instantiations. Section 3 describes the
methodology for learning under robustness objectives, with
an emphasis on two particular instantiations of our general
robustness framework. Sections 4 and 5 detail key com-
ponents of these instantiations, and our implementations.
Sections 6,7 contain experimental results on real-world
datasets. Finally we draw some conclusions in Section 8.
2 A Robustness Framework
We are considering classification problems given by an
input space X , a label space Y = {0, . . . ,K − 1}, and a
data distribution consisting of an input distribution P (X),
and a conditional label distribution P (Y |X). A classifier
is any mapping f : X → Y . By as slight abuse of notation
we also use Y to denote the true labeling functions Y :
X → Y defined by Y (x) := arg maxy P (Y = y|X = x).
It is assumed that training and test data consists of pairs
(x, y).
Following the motivation provided by adversarial exam-
ples, non-robustness of a classifier f is associated with
the existence of pairs of examples x, x′ ∈ X that are very
close to each other (in the traditional context of image clas-
sification: indistinguishable to the human eye), but labeled
differently by f . This entails that X must be endowed with
a metric. More specifically, X is usually taken to be Rd for
some d ≥ 1, with a metric induced by one of the standard
norms on Rd.
Underlying our robustness framework are the following
assumptions and principles:
1. Robustness is orthogonal to accuracy (or generaliza-
tion). In particular, a constant classifier with
f(x) = i for some i ∈ Y and all x ∈ X always
is maximally robust. This does not entail that
robustness and accuracy are necessarily in con-
flict; only that they are separate, distinguishable
objectives.
2. Robustness of a model f is defined only in terms of
f itself, and the given classification problem. In
particular, robustness is not dependent on specific
(algorithmic) tools for assessing robustness, such
as specific adversarial example generators (even
though for approximate robustness evaluations
such tools may be required).
Assumption 2. gives rise to a hierarchy of robustness con-
cepts reflecting their dependence on different elements: we
distinguish three types of robustness concepts, according
to whether they are defined in terms of
Type 1 only the classifier f ,
Type 2 the classifier f , and the input distribution P (X)
Type 3 f, P (X), and the label distribution P (Y |X)
Case 1 leads to very strong robustness concepts capturing
robustness under possibly significant changes of the input
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distribution (out-of-sample robustness) or different pertur-
bation types [11]. However, the generality of the resulting
robustness notions then will come at a cost for the accu-
racy of f when data is generated by P (X) and P (Y |X).
Robustness that is defined relative to the given P (X) (and
possibly P (Y |X)) leads to a focus on on-manifold ro-
bustness that is compatible with accuracy [21], but less
powerful with regard to inputs that are out-of-sample or
malicious off-manifold attacks.
We now develop in three steps a flexible framework that
can accommodate a wide range of robustness concepts of
all three types. In the following B(x) denotes the open
-ball around x, defined relative to a chosen metric on Rd.
Definition 1 (Basic Robustness Measure) Let f be a clas-
sifier and Q(X) a distribution on X . The function
RfQ : X × R+ → [0, 1]
(x, ) 7→ Q(f(X) = f(x)|B(x)) (1)
is called the basic robustness measure of f with respect to
Q.
The basic robustness measure measures the stability of
the classifiers output in a local neighborhood of x when
examples are generated by a distribution Q. Integrating
RfQ(x, ) over x gives an overall robustness score for f
relative to inputs generated by Q, as a function of . Inte-
grating over , on the other hand, gives a local robustness
score at x ∈ X . Integrating over both x and  gives an
overall scalar robustness score. However, simply taking
the integral overRfQ is too crude to encode many important
versions of robustness. We therefore generalize the basic
robustness measure by adding functions that allow to ex-
tract specific features of RfQ, and to give suitable weights
to x and  in the integration.
Definition 2 (Robustness Function) Let H : [0, 1]→ R+
andG : X×R→ R+ be integrable non-negative functions.
Then
ρfQ,H,G : X × R+ → R+
(x, ) 7→ H(RfQ(x, ))G(x, )
(2)
is the robustness function of f defined by Q,H and G.
Integrating the robustness function then gives a robustness
score for a classifier:
Definition 3 (Robustness Score) For a given f , Q, H , and
G we define the robustness score
RfQ,H,G =
∫ d
0
∫
X
ρfQ,H,G(x, )dx d. (3)
We next illustrate how the general robustness concepts
introduced by Definitions 1-3 can be instantiated to ob-
tain previously proposed and novel robustness concepts of
types 1-3. In several of these examples we use for H the
function
H(p) := I[p = 1], (4)
with I[·] the indicator function. Under mild regularity con-
ditions on f 1, H(RfQ(x, )) then becomes I[∀x′ ∈ B(x) :
f(x′) = f(x)]. To simplify descriptions, from now on we
assume that X is the m-dimensional unit hypercube, and
we denote with d =
√
m its diameter.
Example 1 (Geometry of decision regions; type 1.) Let
X ⊂ Rd be compact, and Q the uniform distribution on
X . Define H(p) by (4), and G(x, ) ≡ 1. Then
µf (x) :=
∫ d
0
H(RfQ(x, ))d (5)
is the minimum distance from x to a decision boundary
of f , i.e., the classifier margin at x. Integrating (5) over
x then gives a robustness score R1 only in terms of the
geometric complexity of the decision regions of f .
Example 2 (Success rates, margin curves; type 2.) Let
Q and H be as in Example 1. Assume that P (X) has a
density function p(x) relative to the uniform distribution,
and let G(x, ) := p(x). Then∫
X
H(RfQ(x, ))p(x)dx (6)
is the probability that a point x sampled according toP (X)
has no adversarial example at distance ≤ . Empirical
estimates of this integral based on a number of test points
xi correspond to robustness scores in terms of success rates
of adversarial example generators (where the estimate then
also is affected by the effectiveness of the generator). Seen
as a function of , (6) defines the margin curves of [8] (up
to a 1− . . . inversion). Integrating (6) over  ∈ [0, d] gives
an area under margin curves robustness measure, which
we denote R2.
Example 3 (On-manifold, label-agnostic, worst case;
type 2.) LetH,G as in Example 2, but letQ := P . We then
obtain a robustness function and robustness score as in Ex-
ample 2, but candidate adversarial examples must now be
consistent with the input distribution P (X), i.e. lie on the
data manifold [21]. The function H only depends on the
existence of adversarial examples, not on their likelihood
of being generated by P (X).
Example 4 (On-manifold, label-agnostic, average case;
type 2.) Let Q as in Example 3, and now define H(p) := p
and G(x, ) := p(x)/. With this H , the robustness func-
tion no longer only depends on the existence of adversarial
examples, but on the probability that one would actually be
generated by P (X). The integral (6) now simply becomes
the probability that two points x, x′ randomly chosen ac-
cording to P (X) at a distance <  of each other have the
1e.g. that f(x) be defined as the argmax of a set of continuous
discriminant functions fy (y ∈ Y)
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same label. The factor 1/ in G places a higher weight on
this probability for smaller . Integrating over  gives a
robustness score denoted as R4
Example 5 (label aware; type 3.) Label-aware (type 3)
robustness functions can be obtained by conditioning the
distribution Q of the basic robustness measure also on
the event Y (X) = Y (x). Letting Q be the uniform dis-
tribution conditioned on B(x) and Y (X) = y(x), and
H and G as in Example 2, one obtains the robustness
concept implicitly (through the definition of the expected
adversarial loss function) used in [26] and adapted in [8].
Letting instead Q be P (X) conditioned on B(x) and
Y (X) = y(x), one obtains the on-manifold robustness
of [21].
3 Methodology
From now on we will consider neural network classifiers
f . We assume that classification is performed by taking
the arg max over an output layer produced by a softmax
function. We denote with fˆ(x) ∈ [0, 1]K the network
output for input x; fˆ(x)[j] denotes the jth component of
fˆ(x).
Applying the robustness framework of Section 2 to neural
networks has two aspects: measuring the robustness for a
given f , and training classifiers f that are robust. For the
second aspect, the robustness objective must be combined
with an accuracy objective. For this we propose the generic
robust loss function incurred by f over a dataset D =
{(x(i), y(i))}Ni=1 ⊆ X × Y as follows.
Definition 4 (Robust Loss Function) Let RfQ,H,G be a ro-
bustness score. Then
L(f,D) = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
log(fˆ(x)[y(i)]) − λRfQ,H,G, (7)
where λ ∈ R+ is an hyper-parameter weighting the ro-
bustness term of the loss.
Evaluating a robustness score RfQ,H,G exactly will typi-
cally be infeasible, due to the three integrals involved in its
definition (two outer integrals of (3), and the integral im-
plicit in the Q() of (1)). We therefore introduce a sequence
of sample-based approximations of these integrals.
First, assume that for each x and  we have a sample
S(x) = {x′1, . . . , x′N} drawn according to Q(X|B(x)).
We then obtain the sample basic robustness measure
RfS(x, ) :=
1
N
∑
x′∈S
I[f(x) = f(x′)] (8)
Replacing RfQ with R
f
S leads to the sample robustness
function ρfS,H,G, and the sample robustness score R
f
S,H,G.
The two outer integrals of (3) can be approximated by uni-
form sampling from X and [0, d]. However, if G(x, ) =
p(x)q() factors into a density function p(x) for x, and a
weight function q() for , then the integral over X can
also be approximated by a sample drawn according to p(x).
In particular, let p(x) be the density of the data distribution
P (X), and let Σ be a uniform sample from [0, d]. Then
we can estimate RfQ,H,G as
R˜fQ,H,G :=
1
N |Σ|
∑
∈Σ
N∑
i=1
ρfS,H,G(x
(i), ) (9)
The sample-based approximation R˜fQ,H,G can be used di-
rectly for robustness evaluation of a given f . For use as
a component of the loss function (4), however, the non-
differential indicator I[f(x) = f(x′)] in (8) would make
gradient-based learning techniques inapplicable. When
used inside a loss function, we therefore replace the term
I[f(x) = f(x′)] with the differentiable cross-entropy loss
CE(fˆ(x), fˆ(x′)) between the network output vectors.
The approximations we have introduced up to this point
are fairly generic, and can be applied to a variety of ro-
bustness scores. In all cases, a key point is to generate the
samples S(x). Figure 1 depicts a general architecture for
training under a robust loss function using a generator g
that generates a sample of points dependent on the refer-
ence point x. The subset of samples with distance ≤  to
x then constitutes S(x). This overall approach is further
implemented and optimized for specific cases as follows.
3.1 Robustness Score and Loss Function for
Example 2
The robustness score R2 of Example 2 can also be written
as ∫
X
µf (x)p(x)dx (10)
where µf (x) is as in (5). Using the sample approximation
for the integral over X , this becomes
1
N
N∑
i=1
µf (x(i)) (11)
The computation of the exact margin µf (x(i)) will usually
be intractable (see [5]). For any x, we therefore approx-
imate µf (x) from above by constructing an adversarial
example x∗ with f(x) 6= f(x∗) (see Section 5 for the
details), and approximate (11) by
∑N
i=1 
∗(x(i)) where
∗(x(i)) is the distance between x(i) and x(i)
∗
. The re-
sulting approximation of the robustness score then simply
is the average distance between training data points and
identified adversarial examples. For the corresponding
robustness term in the loss function, we also use the soft
version of the indicator function. The resulting robustness
term in the loss function then is
λ
N
N∑
i=1
∗(x(i))
CE(fˆ(x(i)), fˆ(x(i)
∗
))
(12)
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Algorithm 1 Regularization Training for Example 2
Input: D, f , g, batchsize
while not converged do
{I(f)1 , . . . , I(f)K } = shuffle(D) //createK mini-batches
according to batchsize
{I(g)1 , . . . , I(g)K } = shuffle(D)
for i = 1 to K do
x′j = g(xj) ∀ j = 1, . . . , |I(f)i |
Perform an SGD update on f , considering the in-
puts xj ∈ I(f)i and x′j
Perform an SGD update on g, considering the in-
puts zj ∈ I(g)i
end for
end while
Score and loss function, thus, depend on an adversarial
example generator x 7→ x∗. We describe in Sections 4.1
and 5 how we generate adversarial examples for training
and scoring, respectively.
3.2 Robustness Score and Loss Function for
Example 4
For the robustness concept of Example 4 we use the generic
sample approximations as defined by (9) for the robust-
ness score, and the cross-entropy term in the loss function.
The key component then is the generator g for samples
S(x) drawn according to P (X|B(x)). We describe in
Section 4.2 our approach for this.
f
Figure 1: f is the machine learning model, trained to
classify an instance x. g is a model for generating S.
Note that g can be a standard algorithm for generating
adversarial examples as well as a generative model. f is
training according to a loss depending on x, f, S.
4 Sample Generators
As described in the previous section, training for robust-
ness loss R2 and R4 both require an (adversarial) sample
generator g (cf. Figure 1). In this section we describe our
designs for these generators.
4.1 Adversarial Generator
We construct a generator g for adversarial examples x∗ =
g(x) in the form of a neural network trained according the
following loss function:
min
θg
[
1
2
‖g(x; θg)− x‖2+
max(fˆ(g(x; θG))[c]− fˆ(g(x; θG))[j], 0)],
where θg are the trainable parameters of g, c = f(x) is the
label associated with x by f , and j ∈ Y is the label with
the second highest value in fˆ(g(x; θG)). The first term
of the loss function enforces that g(x) to be as close as
possible to x, while the second term tries to generate g(x)
in a such a way that f(g(x)) 6= f(x). After training the
generator g for a fixed f , it is used to generate adversarial
examples for all training examples x(i), which then deter-
mine the loss function in the next iteration of training f . A
detailed description of the co-training of f and g is given
in Algorithm 1.
4.2 Manifold Generator
For generating samples according to P (X|B(x)) we con-
struct g as an autoencoder trained on the training instances
x(i). Let enc and dec denote the encoding and decoding
functions of g, respectively. To generate examples that
locally at x follow (approximately) the distribution P (X),
we sample
S(x) = {x′i = dec(enc(x) +N (0, σ2)); i = 1, . . . ,M},
(13)
i.e., we add random noise to the encoding of x, and map
the result back into the input space X . From this the sets
S(x) are constructed as described in Section 3.
5 Robustness Evaluation
For scoring a given model f with respect to a given robust-
ness objective we can follow the generic approach outlined
in Section 3. For the particular instances R2 and R4 we
can base the scoring on the same generators g as described
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 in the context of training. However,
when scoring robustness w.r.t. R2 of models f learned by
different techniques, then re-using our adversarial genera-
tor g used in training also for scoring purposes would bias
the results. For scoring, we therefore construct adversarial
examples x∗ as follows:
• we consider a set of state-of-the-art strategies
for generating adversarial examples, FGSM [7],
PGD [16], and BG [10].
• for a trained model f we generate all the adver-
sarial examples according to the methods listed
above, i.e. for each x in the test set we generate a
set Adv(x) = {xFGSM , xPDG, xBG}:
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x
Figure 2: A cartoon showing the idea behind the selection
of the adversarial example for evaluating the robustness
score for Example 2. The blue thick line represents the
local decision boundary for x. xFGSM , xPGD, and xBG
are adversarial examples generated from x. By using bi-
nary search all the adversarial examples are moved to the
decision boundary on the direction of x.
• for each x′ ∈ Adv(x) we determine
x′ = min{ : f(x+ (x′ − x)) 6= f(x)} (14)
and let xˆ = x+ x′(x′ − x). In practice, xˆ is es-
timated by a binary search under the assumption
that there is only one decision boundary on the
line between x and x′.
• we select from among xˆFGSM , xˆPDG, xˆBG the
one that lies closest to x as the adversarial exam-
ple x∗.
6 Experiments for Example 2
We evaluated the proposed training approach for Ex-
ample 2 on 4 datasets: MNIST [15], CIFAR-10 [13],
SVHN [18], and F(ashion)-MNIST [28]. MNIST con-
tains 28× 28 pixel gray scale handwritten digits uniformly
distributed over 10 classes, divided in 60, 000 and 10, 000
examples for training and test respectively. SVHN contains
32× 32 pixel RGB images of street view house numbers
uniformly distributed over 10 classes, divided in 73, 257
and 26, 032 examples for training and test respectively.
CIFAR-10 contains 32× 32 pixel RGB natural images uni-
formly distributed over 10 classes, divided in 50, 000 and
10, 000 examples for training and test respectively. Finally
F-MNIST is a dataset of Zalando’s article 28× 28 images,
consisting of a training set of 60, 000 examples and a test
set of 10, 000 examples, uniformly distributed within 10
classes.
For each dataset we compared 3 neural networks f which
share the same structure: a model trained without any
robustness regularization, a model trained with the regular-
ization penalty from [10] , and a model trained according
the our proposed regularization penalty defined in Equation
12, in conjunction with the adversarial generator described
in Section 4.1.
For MNIST, SVHN, and F-MNIST we used for f the same
convolutional neural network architecture. For CIFAR-10,
we used instead the state-of-the-art model ResNet 20 de-
scribed in [9]. g is another convolutional neural network,
whose structure is the same for all the datasets (with the
exception of the filters of the last layer that depend whether
the input picture is grayscale or RGB). The implementation
details of f and g are described in the supplementary ma-
terial. We first trained the models without any robustness
regularization, obtaining accuracies as shown in the first
column of Table 1. We then trained using the robustness
regularizer of [10] (in the following referred to as HEIN
method) and our approach using different values of the
λ parameter that trades off accuracy vs. robustness (cf.
Equation 4; HEIN has a corresponding parameter). We
report in the following the results that were obtained with
the λ parameter value that matched most closely the learn-
ing without robustness regularization in terms of test set
accuracy. The second and third column of Table 1 show
the obtained accuracies. Note that here we are not so much
interested in improving the state of the art in terms of ac-
curacy, but in improving robustness of reasonably accurate
models. Therefore, we compare the robustness scores on
models that have similar accuracies.
Table 1: Classification accuracies for the three setups for
all the datasets.
DATA SET NO REG. HEIN OURS
MNIST 99.45% 98.98% 98.74%
CIFAR-10 92.16% 90.44% 89.96%
SVHN 93.30% 93.11% 92.87%
F-MINST 93.72% 93.30% 93.29%
For evaluating the robustness of the models, we used the
adversarial example construction described in Section 5.
In Figure 4 we plot the margin probability (6) against -
values. These are essentially the marginal curves defined
by [8]. The areas under these curves, i.e. our R2 score
are reported in the legends. The results suggest that our
proposed method allows to learn more robust models while
keeping the accuracy almost unchanged.
We also evaluated the effectiveness of the three methods
BG, FGSM and PGD for generating adversarial examples.
Table 2 reports the percentage of training examples for
which the respective methods led to the final closest adver-
sarial example x∗ (for each dataset and for each method).
The results suggest that the BG technique produces in
general closer adversarial examples to the original inputs.
It is worth pointing out that this shows that the results
reported in Figure 4 are mostly based on adversarial exam-
ples generated by the BG method, which the HEIN method
is designed to defend against.
Examples of adversarial examples generated with the BG
algorithm and their L2-distance to the original data point
are depicted in Figure 3. This illustrates that the adversar-
ial example for our method is visually significantly more
distinct than the adversarial examples for the other two
6
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Table 2: For each method and dataset, the columns represent the percentage of closest adversarial examples to the
original examples, after the binary search.
DATASET
NO REG HEIN OURS
BG FGSM PGD BG FGSM PGD BG FGSM PGD
MNIST 98.32 0.53 1.15 85.11 0.95 13.94 25.65 1.21 73.14
CIFAR-10 94.50 3.85 1.65 91.58 6.50 1.92 90.89 6.49 2.62
SVHN 94.26 2.76 2.98 93.73 3.93 2.34 93.75 3.05 3.20
F-MNIST 94.09 3.05 2.86 93.54 3.60 2.86 89.22 2.91 7.87
methods. A larger and systematic set of illustrative exam-
ples is given in the supplementary material.
Ours
 Correct: 1 - Predicted: 8
 L2: 3.629
Hein
 Correct: 1 - Predicted: 4
 L2: 1.186
No Reg
 Correct: 1 - Predicted: 8
 L2: 1.154
Figure 3: Examples of adversarial examples closed to the
margin generated by using [10] for the three models. The
three adversarial examples are generated according to the
same input picture. From left to right, the adversarial ex-
amples are constructed from the models with the proposed
regularization, the regularization proposed by [10], and no
regularization.
6.1 Experiments on C-MNIST
C-MNIST [17] contains a suite of 15 corruptions applied
to the MNIST test set. It is intended as a set of test cases
for robust MNIST classifiers, and no examples from this
set should be used during training. We evaluate the ac-
curacy we obtained by evaluating C-MNIST on the three
neural networks trained for the experiments in Section 6.
Table 3 shows the accuracies for the three setups. [17]
had obtained results in which a baseline convolutional neu-
ral network performed better on C-MNIST when trained
without any robustness regularization, than when trained
under several adversarial training strategies. In our result
both HEIN and our method lead to improved accuracy over
the baseline approach (however, the underlying network
architectures are different, so our results are not compa-
rable in absolute terms to the results given in [17]). The
performance of HEIN and our method are very similar on
average. Remarkable are the sometimes very significant
differences on individual types of corruptions.
7 Experiments for Example 4
We evaluated the proposed regularization for Example 4
on F-MNIST. Here, we compared our model against the
approach by [21].
The structure f is exactly the same as the one described
in Section 6 for the two methods, while g is a Wasser-
stein Autoencoder [25] consisting of an encoder genc and
a decoder gdec (the details are reported in the Appendix).
First we train the autoencoder g, and then, whilst keep-
ing g fixed, we train f . g is used for generating Σ and
S(x) (we fix the cardinality of Σ to 10 and σ = 0.06) at
each training step of f . The robustness score is calculated
according R4 by using the same generated Σ and S(x)
(we chose |Σ| = 200), for each x for both the approaches.
Table 4 reports the accuracies and the robustness scores
evaluated for both the methods. The results show better
generalization for our approach, while keeping a slightly
higher robustness score.
Finally, we investigated the effectiveness of the score-
specific training techniques for their respective robust-
ness objectives. For this we trained F-MNIST models
both under the R2 and R4 objectives, and also evaluated
each model under both objectives. Table 5 shows that
R2-training is much more effective for the R2 objective
than R4-training. When looking at the R4 objective, then
both training regimes lead to similar scores. However, the
on-manifold, average case nature of the R4 objective is
more closely aligned with an accuracy objective, which
is reflected in the fact that under R4 training we obtain a
somewhat higher accuracy (numbers reported in parenthe-
ses in Table 5)
8 Conclusions
We have introduced a general framework for defining ro-
bustness of machine learning models. Our framework
allows flexible definitions for different types of robustness
that in a uniform manner permit to calibrate robustness ob-
jectives with respect to different assumptions on the nature
of adversarial attacks. We have outlined a general method-
ology for training models under a given objective, and for
two different objectives instantiated and implemented the
method. Experimental results show competitive results in
terms of robustness scores while preserving the accuracies
on four real-world benchmark datasets.
In future work we will pursue theoretical analyses of ro-
bustness that now is supported by the precise definitions
we have provided. For example, we plan to link the size
of perturbations of the input distribution as measured by
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Figure 4: Qualitative and quantitative robustness results for the MNIST, CIFAR-10, SVHN, and F-MNIST. The legends
report the area under the curves as quantitative measure of robustness. Higher areas corresponds to more robust models.
the Wasserstein metric to accuracy-preservation guaran-
tees provide by different robustness measures. On the
experimental side, it is highly desirable to develop further,
relevant robustness assessment protocols along the lines
that the C-MNIST benchmark suite suggests.
Table 3: Classification accuracies for the three setups for
all the corruptions of C-MNIST datasets. For each row the
best accuracy is highlighted in bold.
CORRUPTION NO REG. HEIN OURS
BRIGHTNESS 45.87 78.74 61.57
CANNY EDGES 60.91 57.86 78.28
DOTTED LINE 96.20 93.59 97.46
FOG 29.03 49.97 56.17
GLASS BLUR 85.56 90.86 85.12
IMPULSE NOISE 71.26 78.13 87.12
MOTION BLUR 95.74 92.72 95.42
ROTATE 94.93 91.61 90.74
SCALE 96.37 95.19 92.73
SHEAR 97.96 97.22 95.78
SHOT NOISE 97.98 97.90 97.58
SPATTER 97.87 96.96 96.82
STRIPE 90.81 89.51 81.72
TRANSLATE 66.87 64.49 45.69
ZIGZAG 86.34 86.64 89.57
AVG. ACCURACY 80.91 84.09 83.45
Table 4: Accuracies and robustness scores for F-MNIST
dataset for both our approach and Stutz et. al., 2019.
DATASET
STUTZ OURS
ACC. ROB. ACC. ROB.
F-MNIST 92.11 0.280 94.04 0.286
Table 5: R2 and R4 for the models trained on F-MNIST
according the two loss objectives.
TRAINING
R2 (93.29%) R4 (94.04%)
EVALUATION R2 1.060 0.471
R4 0.285 0.286
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